Técnicas militares utilizadas no Haiti serviram de inspiração para as UPPs

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Reference ID: 04BRASILIA676
Created: 2004-03-19 20:25
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Brasilia

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000676

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS BR UNSC
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR’S DEMARCHES TO MRE U/S PEDROSA
ON HAITI MIF, IRAQ AND UNCHR ISSUES

REF: A. A. STATE 56282
¶B. B. STATE 56666
¶C. C. STATE 41252 AND 44603
¶D. D. BRASILIA 616

Classified By: AMBASSADOR HRINAK. REASONS: 1.5 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. On 19 March Ambassdor, accompanied by
PolCouns, met with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for
Political Affairs Vera Pedrosa to deliver demarches
requesting immediate contributions to the Hait MIF (ref B),
and soliciting Brazil’s support for USG plans and goals for
building a democratic and prosperous Iraq (ref A).
Ambassador also took the opportunity to discuss cooperation
with Brazil in the UN Committee on Human Rights (refs C and
D). On Haiti, Pedrosa responded that operational and
budgetary challenges, the need for congressional approval and
GOB concerns about operations under a Chapter 7 mandate all
make an immediate Brazilian deployment unlikely. Longer
term, the issue of a Chapter 7 v. Chapter 6 mandate for the
follow-on stabilization force would need to be considered,
but may be “manageable” so long as there continues to be
strong GOB political will to participate, she said. Pedrosa
said Brazil has not offered, and is not encouraging a
request, for provision in Brazil of asylum to Aristide. On
Iraq, Brazil is considering reopening its embassy, but still
evaluating the security environment. In the UNCHR, Pedrosa
said she hoped the U.S. and Brazil will find issues for
cooperation, but noted that Brazil’s delegation has already
been instructed to abstain on any Cuba resolution. Key points
follow below. End summary.

HAITI

¶2. (C) In the absence of Foreign Minister Amorim (on his way
to China) Ambassador provided Pedrosa with a Portuguese
language paper containing ref B points, and explained there
is an urgent need for additional forces now if the MIF is to
secure and stabilize areas of the country beyond the capital.
Ambassador also welcomed the arrival in Haiti on 19 March of
a Brazilian military fact-finding mission, encouraged
deployment of a Brazilian liaison officer to the U.S.
Southern Command as soon as possible, and reiterated
SOUTHCOM’s willingness to try to provide as much operational
support as possible for Brazil’s deployment to Haiti,
especially if that could facilitate a positive GOB response
to ref B request.

¶3. (C) Pedrosa responded that Brazil continues to plan for
participation in a stabilization mission following the 90-day
MIF period established by UNSCR 1529. However, she expressed
doubts that Brazil could move sooner in making an immediate
deployment because (1) Brazil’s congress must approve any
deployment of forces, (2) the operational planning and
budgetary issues confronting the GOB are challenging and will
take time to work through. She noted particularly that the
GOB formula for reimbursing its soldiers for PKO missions is
extremely expensive for the national government, hence
extensive consultations are necessary with the planning
ministry, as well as congress, before moving ahead with a
large-scale deployment of forces.

¶4. (C) PolCouns asked Pedrosa and MRE North America Division
Chief Washington Pereira (also present in the meeting)
whether the MIF’s current mandate under Chapter 7 (as opposed
to Chapter 6) would be a problem for an immediate Brazilian
deployment now, and whether it would continue to be a problem
if the UN maintains a Chapter 7 mandate in Haiti for the
follow-on force. Pedrosa said the GOB has traditionally
interpreted Brazil’s constitution as permitting Brazilian
forces to participate only in Chapter 6 peace-keeping (as
opposed to Chapter 7 peace-enforcement) missions. Hence for
both an immediate deployment and for participation in the
follow-on mission, this would be a serious issue for the GOB
(and potentially its congress) to deliberate. However,
Pedrosa and Washington Pereira did note that there is strong
GOB interest in participating in Haiti, hence a Chapter 6-7
dilemma, should one arise in the context of the follow-on
deployment, may be “manageable,” so long as there continues
to be GOB political will to support participation.

¶5. (C) Ambassador asked whether Pedrosa could comment on some
reports that Aristide may seek asylum in Brazil. Pedrosa
responded that Brazil had neither offered nor received a
request in this regard, and she opined that the GOB would be
unlikely to view the idea “with enthusiasm” should a request
be made.

IRAQ
¶6. (SBU) Ambassador provided ref A paper, with a Portuguese
summary, to Pedrosa, and indicated the USG is seeking general
support for reftel plans and goals, as opposed to specific
actions. She noted that she understood Brazil is considering
reopening its embassy in Iraq, and that there are many
Brazilian companies with long experience and strong interest
in Iraq.

¶7. (SBU) Pedrosa indicated she would study ref A paper
carefully, and confirmed that the GOB is considering
reopening its mission in Iraq, but continues to study
carefully the security situation on the ground.

UNCHR Issues

¶8. (C) Turning to UNCHR issues, Ambassador provided Pedrosa
with papers containing a number of points on USG perspectives
on CHR cooperation with GRULAC and on a range of other
issues, noting the points had been provided by the Embassy in
earlier demarches to the MRE human rights division, and that
we looked forward to further reactions (refs C and D). She
also asked whether Pedrosa wished to outline some of the
GOB’s priorities for the UNCHR. Pedrosa expressed the hope
that the USG and GOB could work together on issues where
their perspectives are similar, though some divergence would
be inevitable.

¶9. (C) On the issue of Cuba, Pedrosa indicated that the GOB
delegation to the CHR had already been instructed to abstain
on any single-country resolution, based on “our customary
reasons.” She said that a quiet dialogue on human rights
with Castro is Brazil’s preferred method to try to effect
improvements.

¶10. (C) Ambassador responded that, at a minimum, it would be
helpful if the GOB could encourage Cuba to accept a UN
special rapporteur mission, and she asked whether the GOB
believed its quiet diplomacy is producing results. Pedrosa
said the decision to accept UN rapporteurs should be made by
national governments for their own reasons, as Brazil had
done. Neither she nor Washington Pereira could offer
examples of positive developments on human rights in Cuba,
but Pedrosa noted that a new generation of Cubans — both in
Cuba and in Miami — offer hope for a peaceful evolution on
the island.

HRINAK

Publicado em 2004, Documentos Originais, Haiti, Notícias | Com a tag , , Deixar um comentário

Na Costa do Marfim, menores fizeram sexo com soldados da ONU em troca de comida

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Reference ID: 10ABIDJAN72
Created: 2010-01-15 17:45
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Origin: Embassy Abidjan

VZCZCXRO9842
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0029
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0001
UNCLAS ABIDJAN 000072

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM SOCI KWMN KPKO
SUBJECT: COTE D’IVOIRE: EFFECTIVENESS OF UNOCI EFFORTS TO COMBAT
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE

REF: 09 STATE 130760; 09 ABIDJAN 378; 08 ABIDJAN 440

¶1. (U) Per ref A, post consulted with the UN Operation in
Cote d’Ivoire’s (UNOCI) Conduct and Discipline Office, the Ministry
of Family, and Save the Children UK on whether UNOCI is effectively
preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and trafficking in
persons (TIP).

¶2. (SBU) Maria Rocheteau, acting UNOCI Conduct and
Discipline Chief, told Poloff there were five SEA cases in 2009,
down from 13 cases in 2008. No cases in 2009 involved minors. In
addition to providing required SEA training to over 8,000 UNOCI
civilians and peacekeepers, her office conducts around three field
visits per month. The office tries to visit every peacekeeping
battalion at least twice during their deployment. However, due to
severe staffing gaps, this is not always possible. Staffing
shortages have meant that the anti-SEA public awareness campaign
planned for July 2009 (ref B) has not yet taken place. There has
been some progress on a victim assistance strategy, however – a
working group made up of UN agencies, the Ivoirian government, and
NGOs has started meeting regularly. Rocheteau noted that more
staff and resources could substantially increase her office’s
effectiveness.

¶3. (SBU) Fanta Coulibaly, the Director of the National
Committee Against Violence Against Women at the Ministry of Family,
says UNOCI is “very involved” when cases of abuse are initially
discovered, but is weak on follow-up support when babies are born
from peacekeeper liaisons. Regarding the 2007 SEA cases involving
Moroccan peacekeepers, the Ministry of Family is still waiting to
be notified of DNA paternity test results. [Note: Rocheteau told
Poloff on January 12 that final reports on these allegations have
been completed, and the peacekeepers in question have already been
tried in Moroccan courts.] Coulibaly suggested that deploying more
female staff with peacekeeping contingents could have a deterrent
effect on SEA.

¶4. (SBU) Yann Grandin, a protection officer with Save the
Children UK (SCUK), told Poloff on January 13 that the SEA problem
among UNOCI personnel is more extensive than is recognized. In
December 2009, SCUK randomly polled 10 underage girls living in
Toulepleu (western Cote d’Ivoire) in a neighborhood known as
“Cotonou,” since it is heavily frequented by Beninese peacekeepers.
Eight of the 10 girls freely admitted they had ongoing sexual
relationships with Beninese soldiers in exchange for food or
lodging. Follow-up interviews with parents and hospital staff in
“Cotonou” revealed that girls go back to their villages and tell
others about their “boyfriends,” which encourages other parents to
push their daughters to find someone who will provide for them.
SCUK is currently examining the possibility of doing a study to
determine the depth of the problem.
NESBITT

Publicado em 2010, Documentos Originais, Notícias | Com a tag , , Deixar um comentário

Despacho revela desconforto em visita de Chirac à Líbia

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Reference ID: 04TRIPOLI31
Created: 2004-12-16 10:36
Released: 2011-04-06 00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Tripoli

O 161036Z DEC 04
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0037
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
EU MEMBER STATES
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000031

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PTER FR LY VE
SUBJECT: (C) CHIRAC VISIT TO LIBYA MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL, BUT NOT
HAPPY

REF: PARIS 8864

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, U.S. Liaison
Office, Tripoli, Libya.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: French Embassy DCM Maurice Dabdoush (please
protect) December 15 confirmed rumors circulating around Tripoli
that Jacques Chirac’s November 24-25 visit to Libya was not a
happy experience. While the French President accomplished his
most important goal – that of simply showing up here, as his UK,
Spanish, Italian, and German counterparts have done in the past
year – there were no major breakthroughs in foreign policy or
business contracts. Libyan “game-playing”, including a surprise
welcome ceremony in front of Qadhafi’s bombed-out house from the
1986 raids and trying to invite Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
along to the state dinner, irritated Chirac and cost a certain
amount of good-will, Dabdoush said. End summary.

The Rumors
—————–

¶2. (C) Dabdoush and newly-arrived French Ambassador to Libya
both departed Libya within hours of Chirac. By then Tripoli was
abuzz with rumors that the visit had gone poorly. The take of
many here, including the British embassy, was that Chirac’s
efforts to “ingratiate” himself with the Libyans after the
coolness of recent years and the ill grace with which the UTA
dispute was resolved had failed. The diplomatic community and
the media interpreted the fact that Chirac’s welcoming ceremony
was held at Qadhafi’s former house in the Bab al-Azizia
barracks, which suffered a direct hit in the U.S. 1986 bombing
and is now a shrine to the 1986 “martyrs of imperial
aggression”, as a slap in the face to the U.S. by both the
Libyans and French. Many were also scratching their heads over
the November 24 state dinner, which the Libyans advertised as a
double bill in honor of both Chirac and Venezuelan President
Hugo Chavez, who was also in town, but which only Chirac
attended.

The Irritations
——————-

¶3. (C) When we finally caught up with Dabdoush December 15, he
confirmed that neither he nor his ambassador had been recalled,
as some here had speculated, but instead had returned to France
to recuperate from the stress of the visit. From the GOF’s
standpoint, the visit was a moderate success, Dabdoush said;
Chirac can now say he’s visited Libya, as so many of his
European counterparts have done recently, and spent quality time
with Qadhafi, as reported reftel. However, disorganization and
constant Libyan “game-playing” with the schedule irritated
Chirac and cast a pall over the visit. Notable irritations
included:

– Qadhafi gave an interview to Le Figaro the day before
Chirac’s arrival, in which he criticized Libyan actions in Cote
d’Ivoire, infuriating Chirac.

– On the morning of Chirac’s arrival, Libyan Protocol invited
diplomatic heads of mission to a state dinner in honor of both
Chirac and Chavez. This was news to the Chirac’s advance party,
who passed it the President before his departure. Chirac
categorically refused, stating that he would have a quiet dinner
with the Ambassador “over a bottle of wine” in that case (note:
alcohol is illegal in Libya). The Libyans disinvited Chavez,
but Dabdoush told us that Chavez’s security guards later got
into a shoving match with some French ministers in the elevator
of the Mehari Hotel, where the dinner took place.

– Chirac had no intention of visiting the 1986 bombed-out
house, according to Dabdoush. The French advance team had
agreed that the welcoming ceremony would take place in the Bab
al-Azizia barracks so that Qadhafi would attend, but the
ceremony was supposed to happen in another part of the barracks,
Dabdoush asserted, showing us the initial site scenario diagrams
to illustrate his point. Chirac felt ambushed, and made his
displeasure felt by his icy demeanor during the ceremony and his
subsequent refusal to put an inscription in the guest book,
where other heads of state, mostly African, have gone on for
pages about the injustice done to the Libyans in 1986.

– The Libyans ambushed Chirac again on November 24 by trying to
get him to lay a wreath at a monument for victims of 1986;
Chirac refused.

What Was Accomplished
————————————-

¶4. (C) Besides actually showing up, not much, according to
Dabdoush; the five cooperation agreements signed during the
visit were merely window dressing, and no significant business
contracts were concluded. Although Qadhafi made his
now-standard plea for military sales, the GOF will respond with
caution, Dabdoush predicted; while the EU arms embargo has been
lifted, certain sales are still tightly controlled under the
so-called “toolbox” arrangement. France will stick to these
prohibitions. Notably, the subject of Abdullah Sanoussi did not
come up; Dabdoush said that the Libyans “know better now” than
to press for clemency, which he believes Chirac is not inclined
to give in any case. (Note: Sanousi was convicted to life in
prison in abstentia for the UTA bombing; the French were enraged
when Qadhafi rehabilitated him, after years spent under house
arrest, and made him chief of military intelligence.) Dabdoush
thought the Libyans have done a “fair” job in keeping Sanoussi
out of the public eye, as they have requested.

Chirac and Qadhafi
—————————-

¶5. (C) Chirac and Qadhafi do not enjoy warm relations, Dabdoush
said. They first met in 1976; to Dabdoush’s knowledge, the last
time they saw each other was during the Five Plus Five Meeting
in 2003 in Tunis, when Chirac was irritated (again) after
Qadhafi fell asleep during Chirac’s speech.

Comment
————–

¶6. (C) Chirac’s visit brought to mind, as so often here, a
phrase that has become almost a technical term in the diplomatic
corp: Libya’s unmatched “wackiness factor.” The Canadians are
awaiting PM Martin’s visit with some trepidation, especially
after Saif al-Islam demanded an apology for Canada’s
participation in international sanctions on Libya in the 1980s
and ’90s. End comment.

BERRY

Publicado em 2004, Documentos Originais, Líbia | Com a tag , Deixar um comentário

Kadafi demonstrava interesse por livros sobre economia e política dos EUA

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Reference ID: 08TRIPOLI833
Created: 2008-10-20 13:44
Released: 2011-02-01 21:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Tripoli

PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0833 2941344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201344Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4009
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0913
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0601
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4530

SUBJECT: COLONEL AL-QADHAFI’S SUMMER READING LIST

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 1. (C) During a recent meeting at the office of MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent), Dr. Ahmed Fituri, P/E Chief commented on a stack of English-language books on current affairs on Fituri’s desk. Fituri offered that he had been personally tasked by the Leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, to read and summarize in four- to seven-page Arabic-language reports “significant” English-language books dealing with American politics and policy, current affairs and history. The books on his desk were those on which he was currently working. Fituri said the Leader occasionally assigned Fituri to translate particular books. Fituri, an academic by training with a Phd from the University of Michigan, said he had begun the work several years ago, before assuming his position at the MFA. Characterizing al-Qadhafi as an avid consumer of television and print media, he said other “trusted officials” were similarly tasked with preparing summaries of books written in other non-Arabic languages. He noted that al-Qadhafi’s demand for these translations had somewhat diminished in the past year.
2. (C) Fituri estimated that he has summarized six to eight books per year, as well as miscellaneous articles from key journals and magazines. He was currently summarizing Fareed Zakaria’s latest book, “The Post-American World” and was about to begin work on Thomas Friedman’s “The World is Flat 3.0″. He had recently translated in full the Secretary’s article in the Foreign Affairs journal. Other books Fituri had summarized in the past year included Zakaria’s “The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad” (which al-Qadhafi liked), Barack Obama’s “The Audacity of Hope” and George Soros’ “The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror”.
3. (C) Fituri offered that al-Qadhafi and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa had asked him about six months ago to undertake a similar program for Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Adviser, with an emphasis on security/intelligence issues and European and American politics and history. Fituri had so far only sent Muatassim summaries of articles and books he had already prepared for his father. Kusa, he said, had complained to him in August that Muatassim was “not an avid reader” and had to be prodded to read even summaries. Stressing that Muatassim had “his own strengths”, Fituri offered that many in senior GOL circles did not consider Muatassim to be as intellectually curious as either his father or his older brother, Saif al-Islam, who is enrolled in a Phd program at the London School of Economics.
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Publicado em 2008, Documentos Originais, Líbia, Países e Regiões | Com a tag , Deixar um comentário

Para EUA, Líbia era modelo de combate ao terrorismo

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Reference ID: 09TRIPOLI955
Created: 2009-12-09 15:56
Released: 2011-06-26 00:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Tripoli

VZCZCXRO1557
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0955/01 3431556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 091556Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5530
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6080
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000955

NOFORN SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/8/2019

TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV KISL PHUM LY

SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678 TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d’Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1.(S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a 417-page document renouncing the use of violence and establishing a new “code” for jihad. The group includes LIFG’s “founding fathers,” individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the “ethics” of Islamic shari’a law and jihad and specifically refutes the LIFG’s decades-long jihad against Muammar al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and supported by Libya’s internal and external security services. As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists (approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The initiative has been highlighted by local and international media as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the Libyan government as a “revolutionary new method to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region.” While Libya’s terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the initiative is significant for Libya’s internal politics — simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam’s credentials — its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization effort remain to be seen. End summary.

SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE, RELEASE OF LIFG

2.(SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison, issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their jihadist ideology — one which renounces violence and claims to adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the group’s historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most senior shari’a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the 417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled “Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of People,” the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that “The lack of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of ‘ulama’ (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious violations.” They credit a deep evaluation of their lives’ experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari’a law for their ideological reform.

3.(SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new “code” for jihad for the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation to “anyone who we might have once had organizational or brotherly ties with.” The document gives detailed interpretations of the “ethics and morals to jihad,” which include the rejection of violence as a means to change political situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim and condemns “the killing of women, children, the elderly, monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the like.” It claims that “The reduction of jihad to fighting with the sword is an error and shortcoming.”

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Vaticano revelou preocupação com eleição de esquerdistas na América Latina

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Reference ID: 05VATICAN562
Created: 2005-12-23 11:09
Released: 2011-07-28 08:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Vatican

VZCZCXRO4957
RR RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHFL RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHSR RUEHTM RUEHVC DE RUEHROV #0562/01 3571109 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231109Z DEC 05 FM AMEMBASSY VATICAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0207
INFO RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0232
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 VATICAN 000562
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KIRF PREL VT MX VE
SUBJECT: VATICAN WARY OF LEFTIST LATINOS
REF: A. REFS: A) LARREA-MARTIN EMAIL; B) CARACAS 3757; C) VATICAN 551 ET AL.; D) VATICAN 552

CLASSIFIED BY: Peter Martin, Pol/Econ Chief, Vatican, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

———–
Summary
———–

¶1. (C) The Ambassador shared ref (a) points on Venezuela’s
nefarious influence in the region with Holy See internal affairs
chief (Vatican number three) Archbishop Leonardo Sandri December
¶17. Some points were news to Sandri, but he was not surprised
and said he shared U.S. concerns about Chavez and other leftist
leaders in Latin America. An interlocutor from the Vatican MFA
as well told the Ambassador that he and his superiors were wary
of connections among these leaders. Neither prelate thought the
Vatican would become more aggressive in speaking out against
these figures, both because of recent history and the potential
for a backlash against the Church. The Ambassador will see FM
Lajolo after the holidays to continue this dialogue. End
Summary.

——————————-
Sandri Under No Illusions
——————————-

¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with Archbishop Leonardo Sandri
December 17 for a wide-ranging conversation on the Church in
Latin America. Sandri, an Argentine and former nuncio to
Venezuela, is the chief of Vatican internal operations and
generally regarded as the Holy See’s number three behind the
pope and Secretary of State. Ambassador discussed ref (a)
points, emphasizing the danger Chavez poses to the governments
around him. Sandri was aware of some points, but others came as
news to him. In any case, he was not surprised. Sandri said he
was convinced that Chavez was dangerous from the time he took
office and Sandri was stationed in Caracas. The archbishop said
he had taken a harder line than the U.S. Embassy at the time,
who told him to “wait and see” what Chavez did in office.

————————-
Holy See Concerned
————————-

¶3. (C) According to Sandri, who said he knew the pope’s
thinking on the subject, the Holy See is concerned about a
general leftward shift in Latin America. He mentioned concerns
about several figures who seemed to be looking to Castro and
Chavez, including Mexico’s Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Holy
See MFA Country Director for the U.S. and Mexico Monsignor Paolo
Gualtieri told the Ambassador in a separate meeting December 15
that his superiors in the MFA were of a similar mindset. They
see the connections between Chavez, Castro, and other leftist
politicians in Latin America, and are concerned about the
dangers they present on many levels.

—————
What to Do?
—————

¶4. (C) While the Vatican agrees that these figures are
dangerous, it sees the question of how to deal with them as more
complicated. The Ambassador’s conversation with Sandri tracked
closely with the description of the pope’s concern on Venezuela
noted in ref (b). However, Sandri stuck to the previous Vatican
line on engagement there; he did not see the Holy See changing
its non-confrontational approach to Chavez given the recent
history between Venezuela and the Holy See (ref c). He
responded favorably to the idea that direct aid from the U.S.
Catholic Church to the Venezuelan Church to help the latter
build up its social programs could help counteract Chavez’s
appeal and blunt his attacks on the Church. Gualtieri noted
that in the case of someone like Lopez Obrador, the Church had
to be careful not to overstep its bounds into politics, no
matter how it felt. He said Masonic groups and some segments of
Mexican society were ready to pounce on bishops or clergy who
strayed into the political realm (ref d).
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Publicado em 2005, América Latina, Ano, Documentos Originais, Notícias | Com a tag Deixar um comentário

Opositores na Venezuela pediram que EUA interviessem contra Chávez

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Reference ID: 09CARACAS1194
Created: 2009-09-14 11:33
Released: 2011-08-15 00:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Caracas

VZCZCXRO4864
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHCV #1194/01 2571133
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141133Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3690
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CARACAS 001194

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2029
TAGS: PGOV KDEM VE
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION PARTY “PODEMOS” ASKS FOR U.S.
ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER CHAVEZ
CARACAS 00001194 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBIN D. MEYER,
FOR REASON 1.4(D)

¶1. (C) Summary: At the Podemos party’s request, the
Ambassador met September 9 with National Assembly (AN)
Deputies Ricardo Gutierrez, Juan Jose Molina, and Ismael
Garcia. They argued that the 2010 AN elections were the
“last chance for democracy” in Venezuela in light of
President Chavez’s dismantling of democratic institutions and
increasing pressure on independent media outlets.
Nevertheless, they were unable to present a platform or
strategy to broaden the opposition’s appeal among voters, and
instead asked that the United States intervene to help
Podemos counter Chavez. As the only opposition party with AN
representation, Podemos faces an uphill battle to retain its
seats under the new electoral rules — and its unique
position as the “voice of the opposition” in the AN. End
Summary.

———————
BACKGROUND ON PODEMOS
———————

¶2. (C) Podemos, the “We Can” party, was co-founded in 2002
by Garcia as a break-away from the Movement Towards Socialism
(MAS) party, when MAS began to oppose Chavez. In 2007,
Podemos split with Chavismo over the merging of the parties
into the single United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV).
Garcia subsequently announced that Podemos represented a
“third way” between the opposition and the PSUV, and the
party continues to claim that it adheres to a socialist
ideology and that its leaders are longstanding defenders of
the 1999 Constitution. Along with Garcia, Molina and
Gutierrez (who is considered the party’s strategist) are the
most high profile of the six Podemos Deputies in the AN.
Garcia and Gutierrez frequently point to their leftist
“revolutionary” credentials, having served previously as
Chavez’s campaign manager and as a member of the Venezuelan
Communist Party, respectively. Podemos remains a relatively
small party, with its geographic electoral base largely
concentrated in tiny, densely-populated Aragua State, and to
a lesser extent in Bolivar State. Some previously
pro-government dissidents may see Podemos as a future home.
(Note: Chavista-turned-dissident AN Deputy Wilmer Azuaje
told Poloff that he planned to join Podemos. End Note.)
Despite its small size, it has enjoyed disproportionate
public attention as the “voice of the opposition” within the
AN. On behalf of Podemos, Garcia has adopted a prominent
role as a spokesman of the opposition and its “unity table”
initiative to create a unified electoral and political
strategy to counter Chavez in the 2010 legislative elections.

———————————–
2010 THE LAST CHANCE FOR DEMOCRACY?
———————————–

¶3. (C) The Deputies began by detailing what they see as
Chavez’s systematic destruction of democratic structures in
Venezuela and the subjugation of state institutions to the
executive. They highlighted the GBRV’s closure of radio
stations and intimidation of the media, and contended that
the 2010 AN elections were the only remaining democratic
space available to the opposition and their “last chance for
democracy.” The Deputies noted their participation in the
opposition’s “unity table” effort but largely dismissed its
effectiveness as a counter to Chavez.

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Publicado em 2009, Documentos Originais, Venezuela | Com a tag , Deixar um comentário

Despacho crítica falta de técnicos no setor petroleiro na Líbia

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Reference id 08TRIPOLI924
Subject A Rare Peek Inside Libya’s National Oil Corporation
Origin Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time Mon, 1 Dec 2008 12:54 UTC
Classification CONFIDENTIAL
VZCZCXRO2947 PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV DE RUEHTRO #0924/01 3361254 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 011254Z DEC 08 FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4196 INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0636 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0949 RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0034 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0479 RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0365 RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4718
Hide headerC O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000924 SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2018 TAGS: ECON?[Economic Conditions] EPET?[Petroleum and Natural Gas] PGOV?[Internal Governmental Affairs] LY?[Libya] SUBJECT: A RARE PEEK INSIDE LIBYA’S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION REF: TRIPOLI 915 TRIPOLI 00000924 001.2 OF 003 CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting, a 15-year veteran of Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) gave an insider’s account of widespread dissatisfaction with NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem’s management style. Autocratic, jealous of his prerogatives and inclined to rely on a small, subservient team, Ghanem has driven many experienced managers into the private sector and allowed key positions on the NOC’s critical management committee to go unfilled, diminishing the NOC’s administrative capacity. International oil companies (IOC’s) have benefited to an extent by hiring some experienced former NOC employees; however, there are concerns that if the NOC’s human capacity is denuded much further, it will cease to be a viable working partner. Ghanem’s reluctance to meet regularly with IOC general managers and his lack of technical expertise have left him isolated and ill-informed at a critical juncture in which Libya is seeking to significantly expand oil production. End summary. ¶2. (C) P/E Assistant met with Karima el-Mshawet (strictly protect), a 15-year veteran of Libya’s state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) on November 18. El-Mshawet started in the Financial Department, then moved to the Human Resources Department as a training program coordinator and currently works in the Internal Auditing Department. With around 700 employees, the NOC is responsible for all oil sector operations in Libya. It is developing a plan to realize optimum returns, exploit Libya’s oil reserves (the largest in Africa), and operate and invest in those reserves. The NOC has publicly stated that it aspires to increase oil production from a current level of 1.7 million barrels/day to some 3.0 million barrels/day by 2012. NOC WAS BETTER-MANAGED UNDER GHANEM’S PREDECESSOR ¶3. (C) According to Mshawet, the NOC was better managed and more active under its previous chairman, Abdullah Salem al-Badri (2004-2006), than under its current leader, Shukri Ghanem. Ghanem served as Prime Minister-equivalent in 2004-2006 before moving over to the NOC. El-Mshawet complained that since he took the helm, most NOC employees no longer have a clear idea of the organization’s vision, mission or strategy. There is also greater fear that they could lose their jobs or be assigned to portfolios outside their areas of expertise. Ghanem is a mercurial personality and a number of people have been summarily sacked. In addition, the NOC’s organizational chart has gone through several dramatic evolutions in recent years. The example of the gas department is illustrative of this point. There was previously a natural gas department; however the responsibilities of the department’s personnel were never clear. The situation became even more muddled after the gas department was merged with the investment department; lack of clarity about who is responsible for what with respect to managing Libya’s gas resources is seen as a key hindrance to the NOC’s stated objective of increasing its natural gas production. AUTOCRATIC STYLE DRIVES OUT EXPERIENCED LEADERS ¶4. (C) Changes in the ranks of the NOC’s senior, experienced personnel due to personality conflicts with Ghanem have also taken a toll. Several former members of the NOC’s key management committee who had repeatedly resisted entreaties from private sector employers have departed in recent years rather than continue working for Ghanem. Ahmed Aoun, former head of planning, studies and projects for the management committee, moved to Shell as a deputy managing director. Ibrahim Elsoul, former head of financial and administrative affairs for the management committee, took a job in banking in Tunis. NOC Vice Chairman Faraj Said is due to retire this year and, according to el-Mshawet, he probably will not stay any longer than he has to. ConocoPhillips GM Page Maxson (strictly protect) recently told us that IOC’s were in a tough position. On the one hand, competent Libyan managers were at a premium; on the other, there was concern that Ghanem could drive out so many qualified staff that IOC’s would no longer have a competent national authority (the NOC) with which to work, a critical problem in a country in which all work on oil and gas is run by the NOC. ¶5. (C) Ghanem’s penchant for a small, tightly-controlled management structure, together with his autocratic style, have also limited opportunities for experienced NOC employees to weigh in on key decisions. Under the current organizational chart, virtually all departments report directly to the chairman. In addition, the management committee has been dramatically reduced in size and now comprises only three officers in addition to the Chairman (Ghanem) and Vice Chairman TRIPOLI 00000924 002.2 OF 003 (Said): Azzam Ali Elmesallati, head of investment and joint ventures; Abdulkasim M. Zwary, head of marketing and manufacturing; and Omar Abdulkarim, head of exploration and production. Replacements for Aoun, former head of planning, and Elsoul, former head of finance – two key portfolios – have not been named. According to Mshawet, the prevailing view within the NOC is that Ghanem believes the management committee does not need more than three members beyond the chairman and vice-chairman rumor. Within the ranks of the NOC’s professionals, Azzam Elmeslati is not seen as an influential person, said el-Mshawet, particularly since Ghanem takes key decisions on investments and joint ventures himself. NOC’S HEAVY-HANDED APPROACH UNDERMINES HUMAN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ¶6. (C) Human capacity remains a key limiting factor for the NOC, and an area in which Ghanem’s leadership has been wanting. The NOC has a stated policy of developing indigenous capacity in the oil and gas sector, a policy supported by most IOC’s as part of their corporate best practices, and virtually all contracts under the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric stipulate that companies will hire specific numbers of Libyans for particular types of technical jobs. Nonetheless, Libyan graduates, especially petroleum engineers, face problems finding jobs in foreign companies due to their limited English language skills and lack of IT and technical knowledge. By way of a partial remedy, the NOC has begun three different training programs for recent Libyan graduates in petroleum engineering, geology and geophysics, and accounting. The petroleum engineering training program takes 18 months, is offered continuously and has 100 engineers per class. The programs for accountants and for geologists and geophysicists have not been held as frequently, in part because those professionals are able to find work in other fields. The NOC has completed two cycles of training for geology and geophysics (with about 100 students per cadre) and two cycles for accounting (with about 50 students per cadre). ¶7. (C) The NOC pressures the IOC’s to hire graduates of the three programs sight unseen; however, hard experience with ostensibly competent personnel who turned out to be unqualified has prompted the IOC’s to insist on interviewing candidates for placement. As reported reftel, a new NOC pressure technique involves linking residence permits for expatriate IOC workers to decisions by IOC’s to hire graduates of the three programs. The idea is that IOC’s will be so desperate to obtain residence permits (a time-consuming and labor-intensive process at best), that they will concede to hiring the graduates sight unseen just to expedite the process; however, it appears that the effect so far has been to stiffen, rather than weaken, the resolve of the IOC’s to resist the pressure. ¶8. (C) El-Mshawet said the NOC is aware that many of the graduates are not very capable, despite efforts by the NOC’s training department to select the best they have to farm out to the IOC’s. As training programs coordinator, Ms. Mshawet was in charge of selecting the personnel for the NOC’s training programs. In order to be eligible for the program, candidates are required to meet certain requirements; however, during the last selection cycle, Ghanem insisted that a candidate who did not meet the standards (he was quite elderly and lacked the appropriate educational background) be enrolled in the program. When el-Mshawet refused to enroll him, Ghanem moved her to a different department. She expressed concern that despite the IOC’s understanding that Libya needs to develop its indigenous oil and gas management capacity and their desire to help with that project, Ghanem’s management style and approach had alienated the IOC’s and hurt potential cooperation on human capacity development in Libya’s most critical economic sector. Libya’s long period of isolation from the international community during the sanctions period and the deterioration of its educational system had made the problem particularly acute. GHANEM VIEWED AS ISOLATED, ILL-INFORMED & NOT TECHNICALLY PROFICIENT ¶9. (C) Despite his eagerness to speak with the international media, particularly about OPEC production and macro-economic factors affecting oil and gas (other senior OPEC officials reportedly refer to him as “the Libyan media whore”), el-Mshawet said most NOC professionals share the view that Ghanem lacks the technical and management skills to properly manage the organization. IOC general managers (GM’s) are almost universal in agreeing with that assessment. British Gas GM Peter Thompson TRIPOLI 00000924 003.2 OF 003 (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that Ghanem’s mistaken belief that he knows everything, together with his autocratic style of management, had left him isolated and ill-informed. Former ConocoPhillips GM Page Maxson (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that Ghanem was much less willing to meet with and hear out IOC GM’s than his predecessor had been. Maxson typically saw al-Badri, Ghanem’s predecessor, at least once a week and enjoyed a candid, collegial relationship with him. By contrast, he typically only saw Ghanem when ConocoPhillips’ CEO is visiting and the tone was almost always combative (Note: Maxson was recently transferred to another post outside Libya. End note.) Other GM’s have told us that Ghanem is in some respects a throwback to the circa-1970′s Libyan oil managers, who viewed IOC’s through a nationalist lens and considered them to be predatory entities which had to be carefully managed. As reported reftel, the ham-fisted tactics by which unqualified Libyans are foisted on the IOC’s, together with an overweaning focus on identifying new cost centers in the production chain from which to extract rents from the IOC’s, have made the overall operating environment in Libya more difficult for IOC’s since Ghanem took over. ¶10. (C) Comment: The conversation with el-Mshawet afforded a rare, working-level perspective on the internal management of Libya’s key parastatal entity. Oil and gas revenues generated under the NOC’s auspices account for 95 percent of Libya’s economy and everything of significance – the government’s budget, salaries, subsidies for food staples and gasoline – depends on the hydrocarbon sector. The fact that the NOC is in the hands of an autocratic individual who is ill-regarded by his subordinates and international oil and gas professionals does not augur well for Libya’s efforts to increase production from 1.7 million barrels/day to 3.0 million barrels/day in the next four years. End comment.
STEVENS

Publicado em 2008, Documentos Originais, Líbia | Deixar um comentário

Documento previa queda no lucro das petrolíferas na Líbia

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Subject Libyan Market Tests International Oil And Gas Companies
Origin Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:29 UTC
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

VZCZCXRO2265 RR RUEHTRO DE RUEHTRO #0979/01 3251129 ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 211129Z NOV 07 FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2847 INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0513 RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0562 RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0354 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0917 RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0225 RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0338 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0666 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0362 RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3274
Hide headerUNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000979 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, PARIS FOR ESPOSITO, LONDON FOR TSOU E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON?[Economic Conditions] EINV?[Foreign Investments] EPET?[Petroleum and Natural Gas] ENRG?[Energy and Power] LY?[Libya] SUBJECT: LIBYAN MARKET TESTS INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS COMPANIES REF: A) TRIPOLI 511 B) TRIPOLI 912 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although an alluring market for the oil and gas industry, Libya is an exceptionally difficult place in which to operate. In their daily operations, international oil companies (IOC’s) face numerous challenges on visas, staffing and taxation issues, and their profit margins are comparatively narrow. The situation is likely to worsen in coming years, as Libyan authorities seek to extract additional concessions from energy companies operating in the country to maximize Libya’s profits, even at the expense of continuing to attract further participation by reputable IOCs in the critical oil and gas sector that is the nation’s lifeblood. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The results of Libya’s latest Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) bid round, which is focused on natural gas, are due to be released December 9, and the country appears to be moving ahead with plans to develop its oil and gas industry. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has implemented three successful EPSA bid rounds since January 2005, and has also concluded lucrative one-off deals with major international oil companies (IOCs) to develop new territories (ref A). The third (i.e., most recent) EPSA round, has attracted almost 60 companies from more than 25 countries as operators and investors. With more than forty IOCs already operating in Libya and oil prices at record highs, it would seem that the sector is the place to be in Libya; however, IOCs describe it as an extremely challenging environment that consistently tests their patience and financial limits. What follows is a summary of some of the most pressing difficulties they face; Post will outline challenges faced by oil service companies septel. NOC TAKES A HARD LINE ¶3. (SBU) In addition to renegotiating existing agreements to extract additional concessions (ref B), the NOC is taking a hard line in a number of other areas. The general sense in the GOL appears to be that the NOC holds all the cards. NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem put it a bit more diplomatically at the recent World Energy Congress in Rome, where he said the NOC is in a position to dictate policies that reflect “changing conditions” in energy markets. The fierce competition among IOCs to enter the Libyan market and book reserves has fed the NOC’s perception that it is a seller’s market. It has also led to the reality that Libya features some of the smallest profit margins in the world for IOCs. One senior IOC official, whose company produces oil in partnership with a state-run firm, recently said his firm makes the same profit in a neighboring country in which its production is only one-quarter that of its production in Libya. That dramatic difference underscores the comparatively high operating costs for oil/gas producers in Libya and raises grave doubts about the profitability of deals agreed in the last two EPSA bid rounds, which featured razor-thin production sharing factors, reportedly as low as 6.8 percent of future production in at least one case. ¶4. (SBU) The NOC appears to be actively looking for ways to extract additional concessions, or to cut services previously provided to the IOCs. Part of this may be the result of the fact that the NOC is unable to effectively stave off other players in the bureaucracy, particularly the powerful General People’s Committee (GPC) for Manpower, Training and Employment. Led by long-time cabinet minister and regime insider Matug Matug, the ministry has been one of the most active in pressuring IOC’s to hire greater numbers of Libyans, many of whom are unqualified, The NOC is striking hard bargains with thin profit margins at the same time that it is asking IOCs to absorb ever-increasing costs — direct and indirect — for work done in Libya. The end result is a substantially more difficult and less profitable operating environment that has given IOCs pause to consider how seriously they want to pursue further concessions. HERE, HAVE A MANAGER … BETTER YET, HAVE TWO ¶5. (SBU) The increasingly restrictive labor regulations for IOCs and service companies, mandated by the GPC for Manpower, Training and Employment are particularly onerous. The GPC for Manpower recently directed that for every new expatriate hired by an IOC, one Libyan must be added to the company payroll as TRIPOLI 00000979 002 OF 003 well. It is required that certain key positions in IOCs’ local offices – deputy country manager, finance manager and human resources manager – be staffed by Libyans. Companies have tried various ways to comply with these requirements, from hiring competent managers away from NOC-run companies to hiring and immediately marginalizing an “empty suit” employee. Other tactics include adding a lightly disguised expatriate layer atop the position encumbered by a Libyan and stalling with respect to encumbering positions designated for Libyan nationals. Expatriate IOC representatives consistently bemoan the time and training required to bring new Libyan hires up to speed; a lack of candidates with professional fluency in English and other basic skills is a persistent problem. IOC managers stress that they invest considerable time and resources training locally-engaged staff everywhere in the world; however, they describe Libyan employees as being less able upon hiring than most, necessitating longer, more costly training. VISA WOES CONTINUE TO RANKLE ¶6. (SBU) At the heart of the IOCs’ struggle to succeed in Libya’s difficult operating environment is the constant difficulty of obtaining visas and work permits. The NOC has increasingly used visas and residency permits as a tool by which to enforce compliance with the “hire Libyan” policy, refusing to issue visas or residency permits to expatriates encumbering deputy manager, finance manager or HR manager slots. Expatriate employees often have to leave the country as their residency permit runs out and remain outside the country for weeks or months while their company works to get the permit renewed. Many companies are forced to use two-week business visas, which may be renewed twice, for up to six total weeks in country. The Byzantine visa requirements put a tremendous administrative burden on IOCs, which typically maintain up to a half-dozen locally-engaged employees to work on nothing but visas and residency permits. The GPC for Manpower’s edict that a new Libyan employee be hired for each new expatriate hired has an additional, visa-related wrinkle: for each renewal of a one-year visa for an expatriate employee, an additional Libyan employee must be hired. An expatriate employee staying on for three years could be accountable for the addition of four Libyan employees (one counterpart at hiring plus one for each visa issued). The NOC reportedly opposes this requirement, but has been trumped by the GPC for Manpower. THE TAX MAN COMETH ¶7. (SBU) Various arms of the Libyan government are also working to extract additional tax revenue from energy sector activities. This is reflected in the imposition of a two percent “Stamp Tax,” which will be assessed on all contracts falling under the December EPSA round and all new contracts signed after that. This tax has been sporadically applied to other areas of the economy, specifically where foreign investment is involved, since it first appeared on the books in 1955. An effort by the Libyan Tax Authority to collect it on contracts under previous EPSA rounds was successfully contested by the affected companies, leading to the Tax Authority’s announcement that all future contracts would be subject to it. There is also a move afoot to extract additional tax revenue from offshore exploration and drilling. The GOL had previously allowed the servicing of these activities out of Malta, but is now moving to curtail that and to require that they be based out of Libya. The relocation of onshore support services for offshore operations generates considerable income for the Tax Authority; offshore drilling operations can cost up to $750,000 per day for deep-water operations. In addition, the NOC recently decided it would no longer act as an intermediary between the IOCs and the Tax Authority. IOCs have been forced to hire additional staff and devote considerable resources to parsing through Libya’s amorphous tax system to determine what their obligations are and how to meet them. RISING SALARIES GUTTING STATE-RUN COMPANIES ¶8. (SBU) Libya’s state-owned companies continue to protest what they consider to be unreasonably high rates for expatriate labor, and have attempted to hold a line at the rate schedule employed in 2002 during the sanctions period. Overall salaries TRIPOLI 00000979 003 OF 003 have risen about ten percent for each of the past two years, but the state-owned operator oil companies (e.g., Waha, Zeuitina) still lag well behind the IOCs in terms of compensation. They are accordingly hemorrhaging seasoned workers, who are taking advantage of high international demand for oil/gas worker to leave Libya for more lucrative opportunities in the Gulf and elsewhere. As the state-run firms fail to offer competitive wages for expatriate workers, they are unable to fill current vacancies. An example is the state-run firm Waha, which has at least 100 expatriate vacancies at present, constituting roughly one third of its expatriate workforce. The situation affects not only these companies and the NOC, but also the IOCs that depend on state-run firms as operating partners. This is the arrangement for almost all companies engaged in production and export activities. The GOL’s decision (under Law No. 43 of 2006) to pull back the NOC’s procurement offices in London and Dusseldorf (Umm Jawaby and Medoil, respectively) also creates problems for state-run firms, which have had their supply lines interrupted by the disruption of a long-established logistics system and the ongoing movement of more than two hundred state employees from Europe back to Libya. ¶9. (SBU) Comment: Libya’s oil and gas sector is in many respects the bellwether for the rest of its emerging economy. The fact that IOCs, which successfully operate in some of the most forbidding environments in the world, are having such a difficult time underscores how far the GOL has to go in terms of reform if it is to achieve its stated goal of attracting greater foreign investment and commercial interest to Libya. We consistently hear expressions of disappointment from senior GOL officials that more U.S. firms have not rushed to enter Libya’s market since sanctions were lifted and Libya was removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Pernicious requirements such as the “one expat-one Libyan” hiring policy and capricious visa policies, however, do nothing to encourage other U.S. and foreign companies with less international experience than the IOCs to enter the Libyan market. End comment.
STEVENS

Publicado em 2007, Ano, Documentos Originais, Líbia | Com a tag , Deixar um comentário

Para embaixada, Veja forjou relação entre o PT e as FARC

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Reference ID: 05BRASILIA785
Created: 2005-03-22 22:01
Released: 2011-07-11 00:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Origin: Embassy Brasilia

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 000785

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR BR
SUBJECT: ALLEGATIONS OF FARC FUNDING TO LULA’S ELECTION
CAMPAIGN

REF: REITER-WHA/BSC E-MAILS OF 3/15-22/2005

Classified By: POLOFF RICHARD REITER FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D.

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In recent issues, Brazilian weekly
newsmagazine VEJA ran stories outlining an alleged plan by
Colombia’s FARC to funnel US$5 million to the 2002 election
campaign of Brazilian President Lula da Silva and his
Workers’ Party (PT). While the timing and sourcing of the
VEJA stories suggest that they were planted for political
reasons, the stories are not wholly fabricated. It seems
likely that the reported April 2002 meeting between a FARC
representative and PT party members took place and that the
Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) conducted an extensive
inquiry. However, it does not appear that any money changed
hands. The fact that the story is being leaked now, instead
of during the tense 2002 campaign when it could have caused
the most damage to Lula’s campaign, suggests that it is a
product of current bureaucratic infighting within ABIN and
the GoB. END SUMMARY.

VEJA BREAKS FARC STORY
———————-
¶2. (C) In its March 16 issue, Brazilian newsmagazine VEJA ran
a cover story (“FARC’s Tentacles in Brazil”) that described
an April 13, 2002 meeting on a ranch near Brasilia between a
FARC representative in Brazil, Francisco Antonio CADENAS (aka
Father Oliverio Medina), and some thirty “leftists” –mostly
members of Brazil’s Workers’ Party (PT). At this meeting,
Cadenas reportedly laid out a plan to funnel US$5 million
into PT coffers by laundering it through Trinidad and Tobago
and into the accounts of 300 Brazilians linked to the PT, who
would then turn the money over to the Workers’ Party as
private contributions. The article states that the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency (ABIN) had an operative at this meeting
and developed a secret file, part of which the VEJA reporters
saw. The story notes that there is no evidence that the
money was ever transferred, and that several of those who
were at the meeting, including the FARC’s Cadenas, denied to
reporters that money ever changed hands.

¶3. (C) The article also notes that in 2003, Federal Deputy
Alberto Fraga (PTB-Brasilia) announced in the Chamber of
Deputies that unnamed ABIN officers had come to him with
secret information about the April 2002 FARC-PT meeting.

SIPDIS
Fraga, who is not widely-respected in Congress, attempted to
open a congressional inquiry but could not round up enough
signatures on the floor.

SENATE HEARS FROM INTELLIGENCE CHIEFS
————————————-
¶4. (C) In response to the first VEJA article, the Joint
Intelligence Oversight Committee in the Brazilian Congress
held hearings on March 17, convoking ABIN chief Mauro Marcelo
and General Jorge Armando Felix, President Lula’s chief
intelligence advisor. They testified that ABIN was aware of
the April 2002 meeting and had investigated it, but the
investigation ultimately was shelved when nothing substantial
turned up. General Felix dismissed the report about the $5
million as “a rumor” and said the agency classified it as
“secret” to avoid leaks that, in the heat of the 2002
campaign, would have appeared purely political. The two also
testified that the internal ABIN documents referred to in the
VEJA article were forged, as they did not comply with agency
formatting rules. Marcelo noted, “What was published is a
mixture of half-truths and half-lies. We do not have any
official documents that the meeting took place.” Felix noted
that, the April 2002 meeting aside, ABIN will closely monitor
FARC activities in Brazil.

¶5. (C) Federal Deputy Fraga later admitted that the documents
provided to him by his ABIN source could have been forged,
but that he had further secret documents in his possession.
(Note: Fraga is now being forced out of the PTB party in part
because party leaders are unhappy with his activities in this
case. End note.) Opposition party leaders were circumspect
at day’s end and seemed disinclined to open a formal inquiry
in Congress. The committee chairman, Senator Cristovam
Buarque (PT-Brasilia), will consider whether to hold a
closed-door hearing to review the other documents Deputy
Fraga says he has in his possession and possibly to hear
testimony from ABIN officers and operatives.

SECOND VEJA ARTICLE
——————-
¶6. (C) In its next edition, dated March 23, VEJA ran a second
article (“They Know Everything”) indicating that ABIN’s
knowledge of the April 2002 meeting was more detailed than
previously disclosed. VEJA interviewed the operative ABIN
had infiltrated into the 2002 meeting as well as the ABIN
officer who handled the case and reported that the whole case
was taken very seriously by the agency, came to the attention
of senior officials, and was investigated thoroughly.
However, this article also did not find evidence that the
FARC money had ever changed hands, though the ABIN case
officer, Colonel Eduardo Adolfo Ferreira, is quoted saying
that with help from the Federal Police, ABIN got copies of
three payment orders adding up to US$1 million that may have
been part of a FARC transfer. Separately, Colombian Vice
President Francisco Santos was reported to have said that
FARC shipped cocaine through Brazil but he had no information
about any transfer of the US$5 million in question.

COMMENT – BUREAUCRATIC SMOKE AND FIRE
————————————-
¶7. (S/NF) This story has both smoke and fire, stoked by a
press that does a good job of digging up facts (and turning
up hidden witnesses) but also has papers to sell. From the
first revelation in VEJA magazine, the story has had the feel
of a political plant. What seems uncontested is that the
FARC official and PT members met in April 2002 and that ABIN
knew about the meeting and investigated it, as ABIN sources
have confirmed to mission elements. These same sources say
no direct evidence was developed that the US$5 million was
transferred by FARC to the PT. Financial scandals break
every week in Brazil –accompanied by great clamor from
opposition parties and law enforcement officials. Banking
transactions and financial documents are quickly splashed
across the front pages. The fact that this case is three
years old and no financial smoking guns have emerged, while
opposition politicians and the other press outlets seem
remarkably uninterested in pursuing what should be a
high-profile case, suggests that the VEJA articles may be
exaggerating the real level of FARC-PT contacts. Yet nobody
is ruling anything out. Lula’s Communications Secretary,
Luiz Gushiken, pointed out that “It is impossible to know
what every one of 800,000 PT members is doing”.

¶8. (S/NF) The FARC-PT meeting occurred as campaigning for the
2002 elections was heating up and Lula’s campaign gained
steam. This raises the question, if ABIN and the
then-Cardoso administration were aware of something as
explosive as a FARC-PT link in the run-up to the election,
why was this not leaked immediately to damage Lula’s campaign
against their preferred candidate? After all, the Cardoso
administration is believed to have torpedoed another
candidate, Roseana Sarney, in April 2002 by ordering a police
raid on her husband’s office. Thus, the Brazilian political
questions are less explosive than the original story: why
the case was not made public in the midst of the 2002
campaign, why it was made public now, and why senior ABIN
officials are publicly indicating that they did not take the
case terribly seriously in 2002, when other ABIN sources tell
mission elements that there was in fact a thorough
investigation. Post believes part of the answer is
bureaucratic infighting. ABIN chief Mauro Marcelo was
appointed by Lula after a career as a Sao Paulo police
officer, and he is still distrusted by some in the military
and ABIN, who may have leaked the story to discredit him and
Lula. (Note, a few weeks ago there was a similar leak that
ABIN agents would travel to Cuba for professional exchanges.)
Other animosities have been stoked because the
administration allows FARC to send representatives to Brazil
(including a delegation at January’s World Social Forum in
Porto Alegre) over the objections of the Colombian
government. Unless there are further, concrete disclosures,
this case may go the way of most Brazilian mini-scandals and
be forgotten in a few weeks.
¶9. (C) This cable has been cleared with Embassy ORA.
DANILOVICH

Publicado em 2005, Brasil, Documentos Originais, Notícias | Com a tag , , Deixar um comentário