Técnicas militares utilizadas no Haiti serviram de inspiração para as UPPs

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Reference ID: 04BRASILIA676
Created: 2004-03-19 20:25
Released: 2011-08-30 01:44
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Origin: Embassy Brasilia

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.



E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/19/2014

REF: A. A. STATE 56282
¶B. B. STATE 56666
¶C. C. STATE 41252 AND 44603

Classified By: AMBASSADOR HRINAK. REASONS: 1.5 (b) (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. On 19 March Ambassdor, accompanied by
PolCouns, met with Foreign Ministry Under Secretary for
Political Affairs Vera Pedrosa to deliver demarches
requesting immediate contributions to the Hait MIF (ref B),
and soliciting Brazil’s support for USG plans and goals for
building a democratic and prosperous Iraq (ref A).
Ambassador also took the opportunity to discuss cooperation
with Brazil in the UN Committee on Human Rights (refs C and
D). On Haiti, Pedrosa responded that operational and
budgetary challenges, the need for congressional approval and
GOB concerns about operations under a Chapter 7 mandate all
make an immediate Brazilian deployment unlikely. Longer
term, the issue of a Chapter 7 v. Chapter 6 mandate for the
follow-on stabilization force would need to be considered,
but may be “manageable” so long as there continues to be
strong GOB political will to participate, she said. Pedrosa
said Brazil has not offered, and is not encouraging a
request, for provision in Brazil of asylum to Aristide. On
Iraq, Brazil is considering reopening its embassy, but still
evaluating the security environment. In the UNCHR, Pedrosa
said she hoped the U.S. and Brazil will find issues for
cooperation, but noted that Brazil’s delegation has already
been instructed to abstain on any Cuba resolution. Key points
follow below. End summary.


¶2. (C) In the absence of Foreign Minister Amorim (on his way
to China) Ambassador provided Pedrosa with a Portuguese
language paper containing ref B points, and explained there
is an urgent need for additional forces now if the MIF is to
secure and stabilize areas of the country beyond the capital.
Ambassador also welcomed the arrival in Haiti on 19 March of
a Brazilian military fact-finding mission, encouraged
deployment of a Brazilian liaison officer to the U.S.
Southern Command as soon as possible, and reiterated
SOUTHCOM’s willingness to try to provide as much operational
support as possible for Brazil’s deployment to Haiti,
especially if that could facilitate a positive GOB response
to ref B request.

¶3. (C) Pedrosa responded that Brazil continues to plan for
participation in a stabilization mission following the 90-day
MIF period established by UNSCR 1529. However, she expressed
doubts that Brazil could move sooner in making an immediate
deployment because (1) Brazil’s congress must approve any
deployment of forces, (2) the operational planning and
budgetary issues confronting the GOB are challenging and will
take time to work through. She noted particularly that the
GOB formula for reimbursing its soldiers for PKO missions is
extremely expensive for the national government, hence
extensive consultations are necessary with the planning
ministry, as well as congress, before moving ahead with a
large-scale deployment of forces.

¶4. (C) PolCouns asked Pedrosa and MRE North America Division
Chief Washington Pereira (also present in the meeting)
whether the MIF’s current mandate under Chapter 7 (as opposed
to Chapter 6) would be a problem for an immediate Brazilian
deployment now, and whether it would continue to be a problem
if the UN maintains a Chapter 7 mandate in Haiti for the
follow-on force. Pedrosa said the GOB has traditionally
interpreted Brazil’s constitution as permitting Brazilian
forces to participate only in Chapter 6 peace-keeping (as
opposed to Chapter 7 peace-enforcement) missions. Hence for
both an immediate deployment and for participation in the
follow-on mission, this would be a serious issue for the GOB
(and potentially its congress) to deliberate. However,
Pedrosa and Washington Pereira did note that there is strong
GOB interest in participating in Haiti, hence a Chapter 6-7
dilemma, should one arise in the context of the follow-on
deployment, may be “manageable,” so long as there continues
to be GOB political will to support participation.

¶5. (C) Ambassador asked whether Pedrosa could comment on some
reports that Aristide may seek asylum in Brazil. Pedrosa
responded that Brazil had neither offered nor received a
request in this regard, and she opined that the GOB would be
unlikely to view the idea “with enthusiasm” should a request
be made.

¶6. (SBU) Ambassador provided ref A paper, with a Portuguese
summary, to Pedrosa, and indicated the USG is seeking general
support for reftel plans and goals, as opposed to specific
actions. She noted that she understood Brazil is considering
reopening its embassy in Iraq, and that there are many
Brazilian companies with long experience and strong interest
in Iraq.

¶7. (SBU) Pedrosa indicated she would study ref A paper
carefully, and confirmed that the GOB is considering
reopening its mission in Iraq, but continues to study
carefully the security situation on the ground.

UNCHR Issues

¶8. (C) Turning to UNCHR issues, Ambassador provided Pedrosa
with papers containing a number of points on USG perspectives
on CHR cooperation with GRULAC and on a range of other
issues, noting the points had been provided by the Embassy in
earlier demarches to the MRE human rights division, and that
we looked forward to further reactions (refs C and D). She
also asked whether Pedrosa wished to outline some of the
GOB’s priorities for the UNCHR. Pedrosa expressed the hope
that the USG and GOB could work together on issues where
their perspectives are similar, though some divergence would
be inevitable.

¶9. (C) On the issue of Cuba, Pedrosa indicated that the GOB
delegation to the CHR had already been instructed to abstain
on any single-country resolution, based on “our customary
reasons.” She said that a quiet dialogue on human rights
with Castro is Brazil’s preferred method to try to effect

¶10. (C) Ambassador responded that, at a minimum, it would be
helpful if the GOB could encourage Cuba to accept a UN
special rapporteur mission, and she asked whether the GOB
believed its quiet diplomacy is producing results. Pedrosa
said the decision to accept UN rapporteurs should be made by
national governments for their own reasons, as Brazil had
done. Neither she nor Washington Pereira could offer
examples of positive developments on human rights in Cuba,
but Pedrosa noted that a new generation of Cubans — both in
Cuba and in Miami — offer hope for a peaceful evolution on
the island.


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